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Reciprocity or conditional cooperation is one of the most prominent mechanisms proposed to explain the
emergence of cooperation in social dilemmas. Recent experimental findings on networked games suggest
that conditional cooperation may also depend on the previous action of the player. We here report on
experiments on iterated, multi-player Prisoner’s dilemma, on groups of 2 to 5 people. We confirm the
dependence on the previous step and that memory effects for earlier periods are not significant. We show
that the behavior of subjects in pairwise dilemmas is qualitatively different from the cases withmore players;
After an initial decay, cooperation increases significantly reaching values above 80%. The strategy of the
players is rather universal as far as their willingness to reciprocate cooperation is concerned, whereas there is
much diversity in their initial propensity to cooperate. Our results indicate that, for cooperation to emerge
and thrive, three is a crowd.
C
ooperation constitutes a key ingredient to understand the origins of animal societies and, in particular, of
human ones1. A number of mechanisms leading to the emergence and stability of cooperative behavior
have been proposed2,3, ranging from kin selection4 to the existence of a sessile or socially structured
population5,6. For the specific case of human behavior7, additional paths for the emergence and maintenance
of cooperation have been proposed. These include reciprocity, be it direct8 or indirect9, punishment10,11, refusing
to interact12, use of social information13 and others, based on the human cognitive capacity to keep track of other’s
behavior and use control mechanisms. Without enforcement mechanisms such as those mentioned above,
human groups often fail to sustain a public resource, which every group member is free to overuse14–16, except
in the case of pairwise interactions17–20. This is also the case when interaction is restricted to a set of neighbors on a
(spatial) lattice, as shown by a number of experimental works22–25 unless there is a possibility to severe connections
to non-cooperative individuals or groups26,27, something that can be understood as punishing or abstaining from
participation.
One of the most plausible explanations for the decay of cooperation in public goods settings is the fact that
many individuals are willing to contribute more the more their partners do. This behavior, called conditional
cooperation, has been observed inmany public goods experiments28–31, often alongwith a large percentage of free-
riders. It can be then seen that the combination of people who behave in this manner with free-riders leads to a
rapid deterioration of the cooperation32. For the case of interactions taking place on a structured or networked
population, similar results have been found in iterated multi-player Prisoner’s Dilemma (IMPD) on a square
lattice by Traulsen et al.23 and in an experiment where it is allowed to change partners by modifying the network
links by Rand et al.27 (except when link rewiring was global, random and at every round). The most recent
development on this issue arises from the experiments by Grujic´ et al.24 and Gracia-La´zaro et al.25, who observed
that conditional cooperationmay also depend on the individual’s own past action, i.e., on the ‘mood’ in which the
subject currently is. In this case, individuals behave as conditional cooperators if they cooperated in the past while
they ignore the context and free-ride with high probability if they did not cooperate.
From the viewpoint of the ultimate origins of this behavior, conditional cooperation is itself a puzzle, as it has
been shown33 that in an IMPD, the only conditionally cooperative, evolutionarily stable strategy prescribes
cooperation only if all other group members cooperated in the previous period, which is not what is observed.
Furthermore, for the case of moody conditional cooperation, theoretical results based on a replicator dynamics
approach showed that in groups with five ormore people, the coexistence of moody conditional cooperators with
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free-riders (and possibly a few unconditional cooperators) is not
possible34. In this paper, we advance the knowledge on this issue
by reporting on a series of experiments with human subjects playing
an IMPD in groups of different sizes. As we will see, the analysis of
our results allows us to confirm very clearly the existence of moody
conditional cooperation in all group sizes, this being in fact the
behavior of almost all the subjects. By developing a generalized linear
mixed model (GLMM)35,36 we will also show very strong evidence
that the behavior of people changes fromwhat is observed in pairwise
interactions to the case of 3 or more players, and is independent of
the group size once at least 3 players are involved. This results in
cooperation actually increasing for pairwise interactions, while
decaying as usual for groups of 3 or more individuals. Finally, our
analysis also indicates that moody conditional cooperation is very
similar in all subjects as far as the reciprocity factor is concerned, i.e.,
how more willing to contribute the subject is as a function of the
number of its previous cooperative partners.We have found that this
is quite similar in all subjects, the idiosyncratic component residing
in the initial generosity or propensity to cooperate.
Results
Existence of moody conditional cooperation. In our experiment,
subjects played a multiplayer prisoner’s dilemma in which they had
to choose one action to interact with their opponents. Payoffs were
set as follows: Mutual cooperation was rewarded with a payoff R for
both players, and mutual defection earned them nothing, while a
cooperator facing a defector obtained nothing, leaving the defector
with the temptation payoff T. R and T where slightly modified for
each of our four group sizes so the expected earnings would roughly
be the same in all cases, always keeping the ratio T/R constant to stay
within the same type of game. See Methods for a detailed description
of our setup.
Let us begin reporting on the results of our experiment by looking
at our first question, namely the existence of moody conditional
cooperators and whether it depends on the group size or not.
Figure 1 shows our results on this issue. We observe that moody
conditional cooperators are indeed present in all sizes, including
groups of four and five players, at variance with the analysis in Ref.
34. However, this disagreement is not entirely surprising, since
theoretical results for repeated games are notoriously sensitive to
modeling assumptions: Thus, computational results on IMPD based
on genetic algorithms38 show that the evolution of cooperation in
theoretical models depends very much on the implementation
details. Therefore, the fact that our experimental observations do
not agree with the predictions of a very specific model based on
the replicator equation is something that can be expected. On the
other hand, we observe only a few players using AllD (always defect)
and even less players playing AllC (always cooperate), so what we are
observing may be close to a homogeneous state consisting only of
moody conditional cooperators, something that is possible even in
large groups for certain parameters34. In any event, Fig. 1 shows very
clearly the difference between the probability of cooperating after
having cooperated or having defected, highlighting the importance
of relating the current action with the one in the previous round. The
plot also indicates that the probability of cooperation increases with
the number of cooperators in the group in the last round, for all
group sizes. Cooperation when no one cooperated before is relatively
large in groups of size 2, and lower for other group sizes (but similar
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Figure 1 | Probability that an individual cooperates after having cooperated (squares) and after having defected (circles) in the previous round, for
groups of 2 (top left), 3 (top right), 4 (bottom left) and 5 (bottom right) people. Open symbols, experimental results; full symbols, predictions from our
GLMM. Error bars correspond to the standard deviation of the observations. Lines are only a guide to the eye.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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among them). Interestingly, the increment in probability with
increasing number of cooperators is similar for all groups.
Group size dependence of cooperation. Figure 2 depicts the fraction
of cooperative actions as a function of the iteration of the game,
demonstrating that the results for groups of size two (i.e., pairwise
interactions or usual 2 3 2 IPD) are very different for the obser-
vations on the rest of groups (sizes three and higher). Pairwise
interactions show very high cooperation levels with an increasing
trend (see below for a discussion of similar, earlier results17,18)
whereas for the rest of groups we find that cooperation decays
from initially large values (around 60% or larger) much in the
same way as in most Public Goods or networked IPD experiments.
The fact that for groups with three subjects or more the cooperation
level behaves in a similar manner is in agreement with earlier
findings that the level of contributions to voluntary public goods
does not depend significantly on the group size39. In addition, the
low levels of cooperation we observed for groups of size three and
four is consistent with the results in Public Goods experiments with
up to 50 rounds40,41. In this context, our experiment, by analyzing
sizes from two to five in the same experimental setup, provides
evidence that there is an abrupt change in behavior in going from
a two-player IPD to IMPD or public goods games with three or more
participants, i.e., we could say that three is a crowd.
The case of the two-player IPD. The results for the pairwise IPD
deserve a separate discussion as they offer several interesting insights.
In our experiment, participants were not informed about the number
of rounds of the game, although they were given an estimate of the
time duration of the procedure, so they could realize that there would
be a sizable number of rounds in any event. Therefore, the ‘shadow of
the future’ effect is very present. As a consequence, pairwise IPD
experiments show a large level of cooperation in agreement with
the observations of Ref. 19, obtained for much shorter IMPDs (an
expected length smaller than 6 rounds). Interestingly, the large
length of our repeated game allows us to go beyond this obser-
vation: Indeed, if we compare our observations to those reported
in Ref. 37, who carried out experiments of length 12, we find an
agreement for this initial part of the repeated game, as in both
cases the cooperation level decreases with increasing round num-
ber. However, as the game continues in our experiment, we observe a
clear trend towards increasing cooperation, punctuated by episodes
of lower cooperation levels which are rapidly overcome. It is
also worth mentioning in this context the (often overlooked) early
experiments by Rapoport andChammah17 and by Flood andDresher
(with only one pair of subjects, reviewed in Ref. 18) which, by run-
ning up to 300 and 100 iterations of the PD respectively, already
showed that cooperative behavior could be stable, in agreement
with our findings here. The similarity of the cooperation curve in
Ref. 17 to ours, including the initial decrease, is indeed remarkable.
The difference in cooperation among groups does not arise from
the initial propensity to cooperate, as cooperation at the first round is
mostly independent of the group size (cf. Fig. 2). Instead, it is due to
the behavior of the players as the repeated game progresses. This is in
agreement with the type of moody conditionally cooperative strategy
we found: the strategy parameters for pairwise PD, being clearly
different from those of the larger groups, indicate that choosing
cooperation is very likely if one cooperated in the previous step, while
the probability to cooperate following a defection is relatively large,
below but close to 0.5. This strategy is not the well known Tit-for-tat
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Figure 2 | Percentage of cooperation as a function of the round for groups of 2 (top left), 3 (top right), 4 (bottom left) and 5 (bottom right) people.
Open circles, experimental results; solid line, predictions from our GLMM.
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(TFT)5, as TFT does not depend on the player’s own previous action,
while Fig. 1 strongly suggests that the previous action of the player
affects her next choice. Our result is also in agreement with those
reported by Fudenberg et al.21, who in their treatments without noise
found that when a player has cooperated in all rounds, a defection by
her partner is not immediately answered with defection in a 42% of
the cases, a number that is roughly similar to the ones we obtain for
our moody conditional cooperators (albeit the comparison must be
taken with caution as the way to characterize the behavior in both
experiments is not exactly the same).
Model. To take into account that our data contains repeated
measures on each subject of a binary variable, we resorted to the
development a GLMM as follows. Let yijt be the response of the
subject i in group j at time t. Let yijt 5 1 if this subject cooperates
at time t and 0 otherwise for all i, j and t. Then yijt,Bernoulli(pijt). By
the nature of the experiment, the subjects are nested in groups. Thus,
a model needs to take into account the nested structure of the data,
and the repeated measures on the subjects.
Our concern with respect to dependency is the repeated measures
on the same subject. First, the observations on the same subject are
correlated just because they are decisions of the same person. This is
also known as within subject variability. Second, the observations
close in time, on the same actor, are more likely to be highly corre-
lated as opposed to the observations further apart. We interpret this
as latent generosity with a time component. Third, another source of
variation is the latent component of the individual reaction to the
number of cooperative actions observed in the group in the previous
round.We can interpret this as latent reciprocity. These latent effects
then measure ‘‘between-subject’’ variability.
Before introducing the model we finally chose as the best for our
data, let us point out that, in alternative specifications, we checked for
effects of major and gender, without finding any significant effect.
Most importantly, we tested the dependence on whether the group
was manipulated by the computer or not, again finding no differ-
ences (see Methods below). With these inputs, we finally proposed
the following model:
logit pitð Þ~
X5
l~2
blx sizeilð Þz
X5
l~2
bCl LagCoopitx sizeilð Þ
zbALagActionit
zaiz
X5
l~2
cilLagCoopitx sizeilð Þzjit ,
ð1Þ
where pit is the probability of cooperation of subject i at time t, and
the factors that affect it are as follows: x(sizeil) is the characteristic
function corresponding to the group size of subject i, that is, x(sizeil)
5 1 if subject i played in a group of size l and 0 otherwise; LagCoopit is
the number of cooperative actions received by subject i at time t2 1;
LagActionit is equal to 1 if the subject cooperated in the previous
round and 0 otherwise, and bl and b
C
l , l 5 2…5, and b
A
l are the
parameters of the fixed effects. On the other hand ai is the latent
cooperativeness of each subject, and ci is her latent reciprocity (the
individual random variation in the response to perceived coopera-
tion). Individual latent effects follow normal distributions: a ,
N(0,S), where S~s2a , where is the identity matrix, and analo-
gously c , N(0, Sc), where, Sc~s2c . In addition, we have the
repeated measure structure modeled as AR(1) structure through
the jit term, where jit5 rRji,t211 uit, where u is a vector of random
variables with variance su. That is, there is a random component on
the left hand side of the model which measures the ‘‘within subject’’
variability. The structure of the covariance matrix for this effect is
given by a symmetric matrix, R, whose (ij)-entry is sur
i{jj j
R .
Model results. The model captures well the observations from the
experiment, as can be seen from the comparison between the
experimental data and the model predictions in Figs. 1 and 2. The
agreement is particularly good for the cooperation level, as this
magnitude can be obtained directly from the model, whereas there
are small discrepancies in the slope of the conditional cooperation
lines, mostly for the highest cooperative contexts. These discre-
pancies can be understood as a consequence of the fact that the
estimation of these lines is an indirect product of the model.
Another feature that is confirmed is the clear dependence on the
players’ own previous action, their ‘moodiness’, an aspect to which
we come back below.
We first discuss the latent factors in themodel. The corresponding
variance components estimated within our model are represented in
Table 1. The corresponding p–values are obtained by applying the
log-likelihood ratio significance test (LRT) on the boundary of vari-
ance parameter space as in Refs. 43 and 44. From this table, a very
interesting result which could not be seen from our analysis so far
arises:While there is substantial heterogeneity in baseline attitudes to
cooperation, the attitudes to reciprocal altruism are more uniform.
To put it more formally, the variation between the individual latent
effect, that is, the generosity, is three times larger than the variation of
the between-individual reciprocity random effects (c). Hence, we can
conclude that individuals, while differing greatly in generosity, are
closer in reciprocity, i.e., they enter the game with a naturally diverse
predisposition to cooperate, but once they are playing, the way they
answer to a given number of cooperative partners is similar among
players. This is a remarkable finding insofar as there have been
reports of the importance of heterogeneous behavior in related
experiments30,45, but here we are able to identify for the first time
the aspect for which heterogeneity is more relevant, namely the a
priori cooperative predisposition of the subjects.
Turning now to the fixed effects, the predicted values for the
corresponding parameters are presented in Table 2. The estimates
and their p-values give us the individual significance levels. The type
3 tests collect the information on overall significance of the effects.
Based on the Table 2, we have size, LagCoop and LagAction as highly
significant covariates at 1% significance level). Other relevant results
include, for instance, the fact that the size of the groups is important
for cooperative attitudes. As Table 2 shows, the parameter for the
baseline cooperative attitude in a group of size 2 is larger and stat-
istically different from all the others. In turn, the baseline coopera-
tive attitude is not statistically different between sizes 3 and 5. The
conditional cooperation declines monotonically with group size,
although the differences become smaller as size increases, and the
coefficient is still statistically different from zero even at the largest
size. This is an interesting point that might be useful to understand
why cooperation is more fragile in large groups, which could in turn
explain why social groups often evolve punishment strategies direc-
ted solely at deviators, as in Ref. 10. Finally, the result that LagAction
is relevant points to the dependence of actions on what occurred at
the previous round. In this respect, it is important tomention that we
also tried other models in which dependence on two previous time
Table 1 | Results for the variance of the random effects. Shown are
the estimates, their standard error and the log-likelihood ratio (LRT)
p-value assessing their significance. From top to bottom, the table
shows the results for the generosity, the reciprocity, and the two
parameters of the AR(1) formalism
Estimate SE LRT p–value
sa 0.8590 0.1075 ,0.0001
sc 0.3311 0.0394 ,0.0001
rR 20.01971 0.0173 ,0.0001
su 0.9021 0.0089 ,0.0001
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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steps was included, and we found that this was not significant.
Therefore, the dependence on the player’s own previous choice is
enough to capture the results of the experiment, a finding that is in
agreement with earlier work20,21.
Discussion
In this paper, we have reported on experiments on IMPD showing
that most subjects behave in a moody conditionally cooperative
manner, reciprocating the observed cooperation after a cooperative
choice while changing into a non-reactive, mostly defector strategy
following their own defection. This had been observed earlier in
lattice PD experiments24,25 and our results now show that this type
of behavior is characteristic of the social dilemma and not of the
number of partners or their (spatial) arrangement. By means of
our GLMM, we have confirmed by an independent analysis that in
order to understand the behavior of subjects in the experiments, it is
enough to consider the actions of the previous round, as the informa-
tion on the precedent round turned out to be not significant.
Interestingly, this may be related to the recent results in Ref. 46
showing that, in iterated games, the player with the shortest memory
in effect sets the rules of the game. An additional insight provided by
our GLMM concerns the universality and heterogeneity of the
moody conditionally cooperative strategy: Remarkably, we have
shown that heterogeneity arises through the initial predisposition
to cooperate, which turns out to be quite idiosyncratic; in contrast,
the probability to reciprocate cooperation after having cooperated
has an approximately linear dependence whose slope shows a much
smaller degree of variability.
On the other hand, while the behavior is generically the same for
all sizes, we have found quantitative differences between size two and
the other sizes studied, as both the probability of cooperating follow-
ing a defection and the initial propensity to cooperate are larger for
size two. The combination of these modifications leads to the emer-
gence of cooperation in pairwise PDs: following an initial phase in
which cooperation decays, compatible with previous observations,
the fraction of cooperative actions increases reaching values above
80% after 100 rounds (albeit some spikes of defection appear from
time to time, followed by larger levels of cooperation than those
observed prior to the spike). In this way, our pairwise PD experi-
ments confirm the possibility of the appearance of very high levels of
cooperation through a reciprocity mechanism which, interestingly,
does not seem to be mediated by TFT-type strategies (even if they
only require one step memory as stated above), but rather they
appear to bemore related to the reactive type3.With respect to groups
of size three of larger, we have found that cooperation is less likely in
large groups. This has been already reported by other authors: in
experiments with Cournot oligopolies, it has been shown47 that for
two firms there is some collusion, for three firms the output is Nash,
and for four or five firms there is never collusion and the Cournot
outcome is obtained. Interestingly, this is also reminiscent of the
results from a recently proposed48 agent-based model for certain
combinations of public or private signaling and players mistakes.
Notwithstanding those results, here, for the first time, we observe
within a unique experimental setup that there is a sharp boundary
separating the case of size 2 from the rest. Indeed, our experiments
show that in terms of the emergence of cooperation in the PD, three is
already a crowd, and cooperation does not emerge. We believe that
this is the case because as soon as there is more than one partner in
the game, defections hurt equally partners who defected in the pre-
vious round and partners who cooperated. Therefore, in the absence
of specific punishment mechanisms, reciprocity does not work as it
does in the case of the pairwise PD, and cooperation eventually
deteriorates.
Our results will have important consequences on the study of
cooperation in social dilemmas. The confirmation of the existence
and generality of moody conditional cooperation leads, as has been
shown in Ref. 49, to the prediction that when players play a PD with
their neighbors on a network, the resulting level of cooperation is the
same as when they are in a well-mixed population, in which they can
interact with every other player. This is a very relevant result, as there
has been an ongoing discussion for 20 years about the influence of
networks on cooperation50, which could thus be closed for good. The
recent experiments on heterogeneous networks25 may indeed pro-
vide that closure in view of the results reported here: Our observation
that three players are enough for the decline of cooperation offers an
explanation for the observation in experiments that different types of
neighborhoods (e.g., different degrees) on the network are irrelevant
as well. We hope that this work stimulates further experimental
research to assess the range of social dilemmas and related problems
for which three is a crowd.
Methods
Experimental setup.A total of 228 subjects participated in our experiments. Subjects
were volunteers from the pool of the Economics Laboratory at the Department of
Economics of Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Participants interacted
anonymously via computers at the Laboratory using software written with z-tree42. In
all, 12 sessions were conducted in three consecutive days in April 2011. Each session
lasted approximately 45 min on average. In each session, the subjects were paid a 10J
show-up fee. Each subject’s final score summed over all rounds was converted into
dollars at an exchange rate that depended on the group size. The payoffs were set to R
Table 2 | Results for the fixed effects. Shown are the estimates, their
standard error and the p-value assessing their significance. The
upper left part of the table shows the estimates for bi coefficients,
i5 2, …, 10. The lower left and the right parts of the table show
significance test results for the different factors in the model. The
tests are summarized in Methods
Effect Estimate p–value
b2 21.4599 ,0.0001
b3 21.6329 ,0.0001
b4 21.7689 ,0.0001
b5 21.5499 ,0.0001
bC2 1.6310 ,0.0001
bC3 0.4940 ,0.0001
bC4 0.3762 ,0.0001
bC5
0.2059 0.0143
bA 0.5910 ,0.0001
Type 3 Tests
F–value p–value
Size 136.50 ,0.0001
LagCoop3 size 71.93 ,0.0001
LagAction 195.68 ,0.0001
Contrast Analysis Bonferroni adj.
(Size) t-value p-value
2 vs. 3 0.61 0.4359
2 vs. 4 2.49 0.1162
2 vs. 5 0.19 0.6639
3 vs. 4 0.47 0.4918
3 vs. 5 0.16 0.6908
4 vs. 5 1.47 0.2272
Contrast Analysis Bonferroni adj.
(Size*LagCoop) t-value p-value
2 vs. 3 61.50 ,0.0001
2 vs. 4 98.35 ,0.0001
2 vs. 5 117.69 ,0.0001
3 vs. 4 0.85 0.3589
3 vs. 5 4.72 0.0311
4 vs. 5 2.32 0.1292
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5 7 ECUs andT5 10 ECUs in all group sizes. The adjustment of the expected payoffs
was then implemented through the conversion rate: The exchange rate was for 100
ECUs (Experimental Currency Units): 2 J in the group of 2 players; 1.66 J for
3-player groups; 1.33J for 4-player groups; and 1J for 5-player groups. Earnings in
a typical session ranged from 5 to 15J. The instructions of the experiment, translated
into English, are included in the Supporting Information. The Spanish original is also
available upon request.
Computer intervention. In half of the sessions, for all group sizes, there was a
computer intervention in the decisions, in order to improve the statistics on the most
cooperative contexts. The players were informed that:
‘‘Occasionally, and in completely random way, the computer can change your
decision or that of the other player. The program does not report this change
when it occurs. In such cases the payment is calculated as if the player concerned
had actually taken the decision that the computer chose. The frequency with
which this happens is low: your actions will remain unchanged for at least an
85% of the time.’’
Computer intervention was carried out in the following manner and only after the
first 5 rounds took place unmodified: From round 5 to round 25, there is a 20% chance
of having a computer intervention. In case there is such an intervention, the idea is to
increase the number of highly cooperative contexts, and therefore every defection was
turned to cooperation with probability (N 2 Ncoop)/(N 2 Ncoop 1 1), N being the
number of players in the group andNcoop being the number of players that cooperated
in that round. After round 25, there was still a 20% chance of intervention, but now it
was intended to increase the number of contexts that have appeared the smallest
number of times up to that round. Let us call the number of cooperators in such
context Nwanted. If this number is higher than Ncoop, we change defection to coop-
eration with probability (Nwanted 2 Ncoop)/(N 2 Ncoop 1 1); otherwise, we change
cooperation to defection with probability (Ncoop 2 Nwanted)/(Ncoop 1 1). This pro-
cedure allowed us to obtain better statistics for the highly cooperative contexts, and it
was mild enough as to not influence the results, as was shown by the comparison of
the results of the treatments with and without computer intervention.
Statistical tests of significance. The statistical tests used in the paper are the log-
likelihood ratio (LRT) significance test of variance parameters, standard significance
tests and type III test on fixed effects, and the contrast analysis for the levels of fixed
effects. The log-likelihood ratio significance test is used for the variance parameters
since the tested value, 0, in on the boundary of the parameter space of the variances.
The theory and development behind this test is explained in Ref. 43. Basically, a low
p-value indicates significant variance parameter, i.e., heterogeneity among the
participants of the random effect. These results are presented in Table 1. The standard
significance test and the type III tests test for the significance on the parameters, the
former individually, and the latter jointly, for all levels of that variable. For example,
consider the variable size. The first part of Table 1 presents the results of standard
significance test results for b2, b3, b4 and b5, which corresponds to sizes 2, 3, 4, and 5,
respectively. The second part of the same table represents the joint significance of the
size effect. i.e.,H05 b25 b35 b45 b55 0 versus at least one is nonzero. The last test
performed here is the contrast analysis. This procedure investigates the differences
between the levels of the same variable. For example, again using size, in the previous
tests we have considered differences from 0; nowwe are studying whether the effect of
being in a group of size 2 is different than that of sizes 3, 4, and 5, respectively. Due to
the multiple testing in this procedure the p-values are adjusted using Bonferroni
adjustment, which adjusts the p-values by the number of tests performed. This
adjustment is more on the conservative side, that is, we do not reject more often.
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